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RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT--THE OFFICE

OF

ATTORNEY-WHETHER OR NOT

ACTIVITiEs ENGAGED IN BY PERSONS NOT ADMiITTED NOR LICENSED CONSTITUTE THE

PRACTICE OF LAW-Although no exact definition of what con-

stitutes the practice of law has ever been spelled out by the Supreme Court
of Illinois, or by any other high court for that matter, the two recent decisions in Peoples v. Schafer1 and in Chicago Bar Association v. Kellogg2 tend
to throw more light on the subject. In the first, a licensed real estate
broker was charged with contempt on an information before the Supreme
Court' for having practiced law without a license in that he had customarily engaged in the preparation of deeds, contracts and mortgages in
real estate transactions in which he was the procuring agent and also
advised a customer, for a fee, on matters concerning the disposition of
her estate. The court conceded that the mere act of filling out blanks in
prepared forms might not amount to practicing law but that, as legal
practice involves more than appearance in court in connection with litigation, 4 a person who elicits information and advises thereon in conjunction
with the process of completing such forms could well be guilty of contempt for performing the functions of an attorney at law.
In the second, a licensed practitioner before the United States Patent
Office was named as defendant in a suit to enjoin him from engaging in
the general practice of law5 albeit such practice was related to patent
matters. It appeared that he had rendered legal opinions relating to the
infringement and enforcement of patents and trademarks, had prepared
and filed pleadings and other legal documents, had construed contracts,
had prepared and served notice of and had asserted an attorney's lien
under an appropriate statute relating to attorneys,' and in general had
engaged in quite diversified business transactions of the type customarily
handled by general attorneys. On appeal from a decree granting an
injunction, transferred to the Appellate Court because no constitutional
1404 Ill. 45, 87 N. E. (2d) 773 (1949).
2 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N. E. (2d) 519 (1949).
3 Original jurisdiction to punish one for practicing law without a license exists
in the Supreme Court which has inherent power to regulate the practice of law:
People v. Peoples' Stock Yards Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931).
4 People v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N. E. (2d) 693 (1948).
5 For the right to seek an injunction rather than to punish for contempt, see
Smith v. Illinois Adjustment Finance Co., 326 Ill. App. 654, 63 N. E. (2d) 264

(1945).

6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, § 14.
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question was involved, 7 that court enlarged the decree on all points, except as to advising and assisting applicants for patents in the presentation and prosecution of their applications before the Patent Office, on the
ground the acts enumerated constituted a type of legal practice forbidden
to all except duly admitted attorneys at law.
While a precise definition of what constitutes the practice of law may
be lacking because of the practical impossibility of making one definition
sufficiently broad to encompass the entire field, the details of that definition
begin to take shape through the medium of a series of cases in which
isolated acts have been held to amount to the practice of law. To those
cases already decided, 8 must now be added the two here noted.
MASTER AND

SERVANT-SERVICES

AND

COMPENSATION-WHETHER

NOT EMPLOYEE IS ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT

OR

COMPENSATION BENEFITS

FOR PERIOD BETWEEN TERMINATION OF STRIKE AND TIME WHEN RECALLED

TO WORK-By a per curiam opinion in the case of American Steel Foundries v. Gordon,' the Illinois Supreme Court has held that employees are
not eligible to draw unemployment compensation benefits for the period,
following the termination of a strike, during which they are prevented
from returning to work by the necessity of bringing the plant into operating condition and the making of repairs occasioned by the strike. The
facts were such in the case in question that it was physically impossible
to put the plant into normal operating condition for at least fifteen days
after the strike had been settled. Claims for unemployment compensation benefits made by the employees who were unable to work during this
period had been allowed by the Director of Labor and had been affirmed
by the circuit court, but the holding therein was reversed by the Supreme
Court on further review. 2 The court was called upon to interpret that
section of the statute which provides that workmen shall be ineligible for
benefits for any week with respect to which it is found that their "unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor
dispute."
It reasoned that, while the act required that the stoppage of
7
8

See Chicago Bar Association v. Kellog, 401 Ill. 375, 82 N. E. (2d) 639 (1948).
People v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N. E. (2d) 693 (1948) ; People v. Goodman,

Ill. 346, 8 N. E. (2d) 941 (1937) ; People v. Securities Discount Corp., 361 Ill.
198 N. E. 681 (1935); People v. Real Estate Tax Payers Ass'n, 354 Ill. 102,
N. E. 823 (1933) ; People v. Peoples' Stock Yards Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E.
(1931) ; People v. Munson, 319 Ill. 596, 150 N. E. 280 (1925) ; People v. Hubbard,
313 Ill. 346, 145 N. E. 93 (1924) ; People v. Schreiber, 250 Ill. 345, 95 N. E. 189
(1911) ; People v. Barasch, 338 Ill. App. 169, 86 N. E. (2d) 868 (1949) ; Smith v.
Illinois Adjustment Finance Co., 326 Ill. App. 654, 63 N. E. (2d) 264 (1945).
1404 Ill. 174, 88 N. E. (2d) 465 (1949).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 230, authorizes direct appeal to the Supreme
366
551,
187
901

Court.
3 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 223(d).
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work exist because of a labor dispute, it did not require that the labor
dispute should still exist or be in active progress and it was sufficient that
the unemployment in question stemmed therefrom. Neither the stoppage
of work nor the resulting ineligibility is, therefore, limited in its duration
by the period of duration of the labor dispute itself. The court appears
to have followed what would seem to be a slender majority rule on the
4
subject, the existence of which has heretofore been noted.

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-GOVERNMENTAL

IN GENERAT-WHETHER OR NOT A MUNICIPAL
ExTRA-TERRITORIAL

POWVERS

JURISDICTION WHEN REGULATING

TRIBUTION OF MILK WITHIN

THE

AND

FUNCTIONS

CORPORATION MAY EXERCISE

Disdecisions by the

THE SALE AND

MtimnPALITY-Two

Illinois Supreme Court, in Dean Milk Companj v. City of Waukegan"
and in Dean Milk Company v. City of Aurora,2 form the most recent
enunciation in this state of a limitation which has been recognized to
exist and which binds municipal corporations in the exercise of their
delegated powers. In each case, the company filed a complaint seeking a
declaration of invalidity of such portions of the milk ordinances of the
two cities concerned as purported to regulate the production and pasteurization of milk outside the corporate boundaries. In the first case, the
milk ordinance provided that no milk or milk product could be sold
within the city unless produced and pasteurized in Lake County, wherein
the city was located. In the second, the ordinance operated to exclude
from sale or distribution within the city, unless labelled "not graded and
not inspected" by the health officer of the municipality, of all milk produced and pasteurized in plant areas not located within a twenty-five
mile radius of the city limits. Decisions in both cases favoring the plaintiff were certified to the Supreme Court because of the public interest
involved.3 In the disposition of both cases, the Supreme Court stated that
municipal corporations do not possess any extra-territorial jurisdiction
4
beyond that which is expressly or impliedly granted to them by statute.
4 See Ablondi v. Board of Review, - N. J. -, 73 A. (2d) 262 (1950) ; Carnegie
Ill. Steel Corp. v. The Review Board, 117 Ind. App. 379, 72 N. E. (2d) 662 (1947) ;
Saunders v. Maryland Unemp. Comp. Board, 188 Md. 677, 53 A. (2d) 579 (1947),
noted in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 180. Contra: Amer. Steel & Wire Co. of
N. J. v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review, 161 Pa. Super. 622, 56 A. (2d) 288 (1948).
1403 Ill. 597, 87 N. E. (2d) 751 (1949).
2404 Ill. 331, 88 N. E. (2d) 827 (1949).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199(1).
4 The one-half mile limit on extra-territorial jurisdiction, conferred by fl1. Rev.
Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 8-1, had been held insufficient to support the milk
ordinance involved in Higgins v. City of Galesburg, 401 Ill. 87, 81 N. E. (2d) 520
(1948).
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While the court expressed the belief that the ordinance provisions might
well facilitate and economize the procedure for exercising regulatory
power over the sale and distribution of milk, it felt constrained to hold
that the ordinance provisions were predicated upon an unlawful assumption of power.
The legal basis for implied limitation upon municipal exercise of
extra-territorial jurisdiction may be found in two early cases 5 which cases
received amplification in the foundational case of City of Rockford v.
Hey.6 The doctrine therein became more firmly entrenched by the addition of the decisions in Dean Milk Company v. City of Chicago7 and in
Higgins v. City of Galesburg,8 which added support to the limitation by
sporadic decisions construing and applying it to differing instances. The
present cases add still more evidence that municipalities possess only a
local right of regulation which cannot traverse the fixed boundaries of
municipal areas. It is evident, however, that there is need for a more
extended jurisdiction if the number of such milk ordinances, as well as
the attacks being made thereon, are any indication on the subject. The
matter rapidly approaches the point where legislative attention to the
question seems desirable.

TAXATION-LEGACY,

INHERITANCE, AND TRANSFER

TAXES--WHETHER

A DEvrSE ADOPTED AFTER REACHNG MAJoPRITY IS ENTITLED TO BENEFIT
OF HIGHEST EXEMPTION AND LOWEST RATE OF INHERITANCE TAx-In the

case of McLaughlin v. People,1 the Illinois Supreme Court was asked to
construe a provision of the Illinois Inheritance Tax Act which declares
that the class of persons to whom the highest exemption and the lowest tax
rate shall apply comprises "any child or children legally adopted. ,2 The
county court had there entered a final order and judgment assessing the
inheritance tax on the basis that the devisee was a stranger, unrelated to
the decedent, thus making applicable the lowest possible exemption and
the highest possible rate of tax. It appeared that the decedent had, some
six months prior to death, legally adopted the devisee, then forty-eight
years old, by a valid decree of a Connecticut court. On appeal from that
5 Straus v. Town of Pontiac, 40 Ill. 301 (1866) ; Kiel v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill.

137, 52 N. E. 29 (1898).
6366 Ill. 526, 9 N. E. (2d) 317 (1937). See also City of Chicago v.Brent, 356 Ill.
40, 190 N. E. 97 (1934), and City of Des Plaines v. Boeckenhaur, 383 Ill. 475, 50
N. E. (2d) 483 (1943).
7385 Ill. 565, 53 N. E. (2d) 612 (1944).
8 401 Ill. 87, 81 N. E. (2d) 520 (1948).

1403 Ill.
493, 87 N. E. (2d) 637 (1949).
2 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 375(5).
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decision, the legal question presented was one as to whether or not a person
adopted by a valid decree of a state other than Illinois was to be deemed
a "child . . . legally adopted" within the purview of the Illinois statute

even though such person could not have been validly adopted in this state
because he had attained his majority at the time of the adoption. 3 It was
held that the action of the state legislature, when it had amended the
language of the Inheritance Tax Act by striking from it the words "any
child or children adopted as such in conformity with the laws of the
State of Illinois" and substituting the present phrase, 4 had evidenced a
deliberate design to bring about a change in the law so as to make available
to all persons legally adopted under the laws of any jurisdiction, whether
such laws were similar to those of Illinois or not, the benefits of the lowest
tax rate and the highest exemption. The decision clearly conforms to the
mandate of the case of People v. Snyder,' wherein it was stated that, if
there is doubt as to the meaning of statutory language used in delineating
classes of persons and applicable tax rates, the construction should be in
favor of the taxpayer. It should be noted, however, that a mere colorable
compliance with the adoption laws of another state will probably prove
insufficient to secure the benefits of the tax reduction.

WILLS-CONSTRUTION-WHETHER

OR

NOT

BEQUEST

OF

MONEY

ON

DEPOSIT INCLUDES MONEY CONTAINED IN TESTATOR'S SAFETY DEPOSIT Box

LOCATED

IN THE

VAULT OF A BANKING INSTITUTION-The facts in the case

of Lavin v. Banks' disclose that the testator bequeathed to his wife, among
other things, all "monies on deposit in my name in any bank or banking
institution." Testator had deposit accounts in two banks but also had a
safety deposit box, containing a substantial sum in cash, located in a vault
operated by a safe deposit company which was a wholly-owned subsidiary
of still another banking institution. The widow's claim that such cash
in the safety deposit box passed to her by reason of the bequest aforesaid
was contested by the testator's heirs at law who filed a suit to construe
the will. A trial court decree against the widow was reversed by the
Appellate Court for the First District when that court concluded that a
3 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 1-1. The present statute makes reference to a petition
for leave to adopt a "minor" child but does not specifically forbid the adoption of
adults. In Bartholow v. Davies, 276 Ill. 505, 114 N. E. 1017
construing an earlier statute, held that the legislature intended
and "children" as used therein, to mean "minor child" and
respectively.
4 Laws 1919, p. 757.
5 353 Ill. 184, 187 N. E. 158, 88 A. L. R. 1012 (1933).
1338 Ill. App. 612, 88 N. E. (2d) 512 (1949). Leave to appeal

(1917), the court,
the words "child"
"minor children"

has been granted.
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liberal construction of the will, made necessary because the legatee was
the testator's widow, 2 led to the belief that it was the testator's intention
to pass all money to the legatee since the average testator would not discriminate between a banking institution and a wholly-owned subsidiary
3
operating a vault in the basement of the banking premises.
Ordinarily, a testator's reasonable conclusion as to the meaning of
the words he has used in his will would not serve to influence a court
called on to construe such will. Even if the testator has made a mistake,
so long as he knows and approves the contents of his will, such mistake
will be immaterial as would also be the case if he mistook the legal effect
of the language used or had acted upon mistaken advice of counsel. 4 In
the absence of any controlling special statute, the safe deposit business is
deemed to be governed by statutes relating to Warehousing rather than
those relating to banking operations, for the operators thereof are regarded as warehousemen and not as bankers.5 The typical arrangement
between the proprietor of the safety deposit vault and the box renter is
that of bailee and bailor.6 If such is the case, the contents of the box
could not be said to be "on deposit" in the ordinary sense of the term,
unless the court herein is willing to grant that there is a difference in the
relationship which arises between the customer and a non-banking safety
deposit vault, on the one hand, and that which exists between the customer and his bank ,or its wholly-owned subsidiary, on the other, when he
utilizes vault facilities for the protection of his cash or other valuables. It
is doubted that there is any such difference, hence the construction placed
on the words used in the will in question does not appear to be warranted.

2 See 69 C. J., Wills, § 1151.
3 As further evidence for that belief, the court pointed out that Ill. Rev. Stat.
1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, § 334 et seq., which regulates the keeping and letting of safety
deposit vaults, is expressly declared inapplicable to state and national banks,
whose vaults are deemed to be an integral part of the business of banking.
4 Elam v. Phariss, 289 Mo. 209, 232 S. W. 693 (1921) ; Leonard v. Stanton, 93 N. H.
112, 36 A. (2d) 271 (1944) ; In re Gluckman's Will, 87 N. J. Eq. 638, 101 A. 295
(1917). In McKee v. Collinson, 292 Ill. 458 at 461, 127 N. E. 92 at 93 (1920), the
court quoted from the decision in Decker v. Decker, 121 Ill. 341, 12 N. E. 750 (1887),
to the effect that, as the statute requires a will to be in writing, courts of chancery
have no power to add to or reform a will on grounds of mistake.
5 State v. Kelsey, 53 N. J. L. 590, 22 A. 342 (1891) ; Guarantee & Trust Co. v.
Rector, 76 N. J. L. 87, 75 A. 931 (1910).
See also National Safe Deposit Co. v.
Stead, 250 Ill. 584, 95 N. E. 973 (1911).
6 Shoeman v. Temple Safety Deposit Vaults, 189 Ill. App. 316 (1914).
Such is
also the case where the box is in a bank, the latter being a bailee for hire, according to Framheim v. Miller, 241 Ill. App. 328 (1926).
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WILLS--PROBATE, ESTABLISHMENT, AND ANNULMENT-WHETHER A
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, SUBSEQUENTLY APPOINTED, MAY INSTITUTE A
WILL CONTEST PROCEEDING IN PLACE OF THE DECEASED HEm AFTER THE
PERIOD OF LIMITATION FIXED BY STATUTE FOR SUCH ACTIONS HAS PASSED-

In Kessler v. Martinson,' the administratrix of an heir at law attempted
to contest the will of the testatrix some fourteen months after that will
had been admitted to probate. It appeared that the heir had died approximately seven months after probate had been granted but administration

on the heir's estate had not been authorized until shortly before the will
contest action was filed. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint
because it had not been filed within the nine-month period after probate
fixed by statute. 2 That motion having been sustained, the plaintiff appealed contending that the limitation period of said statute had to be
construed with Section 20 of the Limitations Act 3 which allows the legal
representative an additional year in which to bring an action belonging to
a person who dies before the expiration of the time within which he might
have brought suit. The Appellate Court, however, affirmed the order of
dismissal.
As the power of a court of equity to set aside a will is purely statutory, being unknown to the common law, it has been said that such power
can be exercised only in the manner and within the limitations prescribed
by the statute which creates the right.4 There being no vested right to
bring a will contest, 5 the time limit set by the statute becomes an element
of jurisdiction,6 which cannot be waived 7 for it forms an inherent part
of the substantive right and is not merely a period of limitation. Such
being the case, the statute cannot be enlarged by a saving clause in a
general limitation statute. In the somewhat analogous case of Masin v.
Bassford,9 the Illinois Supreme Court had held that a conservator of an
incompetent heir was barred from maintaining a will contest proceeding
on behalf of the incompetent after the expiration of the nine-month
1339 Ill. App. 207, 89 N. E. (2d) 735 (1949).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 242.
S Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 20. The additional one-year period is measured from the
date of death and not from the date of the appointment of the legal representative.
4 McQueen v. Connor, 385 Il1. 455, 53 N. E. (2d) 435 (1944).
G Sharp v. Sharp, 213 Ill. 332, 72 N. E. 1058 (1905).
6 Clowry v. Nolan, 221 Ill. 458, 77 N. E. 906 (1906) ; Storrs v. St. Luke's Hospital,
180 Ill. 368, 54 N. E. 185 (1899) ; Harvey v. Wilson, 198 Ill. App. 477 (1916).
7 Waters v. Waters, 225 Ill. 559, S0 N. E. 337 (1907).
8 For a discussion of statutes which create rights not existing at common law in
which time has been made an inherent element to the exercise of the right, see
Smith v. Toman, 368 Ill. 414, 14 N. E. (2d) 478, 118 A. L. R. 924 (1938).
9381 Ill. 569, 46 N. E. (2d) 366 (1943).
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period.'" The present case goes one step farther in this strict construction for the administratrix in the instant case had no power to act until
some months after the right of contest had been lost whereas the conservator in the case mentioned had had ample time in which to sue.
Despite this, it seems safe to conclude that will contests constitute one
1
area in which no delay will be tolerated.

WORKMEN 'S

COMPENSATION-PAYMENT

OF COMPENSATION

AND

CoM-

PLIANCE WITH AWARD-WHETHER OR NOT VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS MADE BY
EMPLOYER TO EMPLOYEE MAY BE TREATED AS PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION
UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-In the case of
Olney Seed Company, Inc. v. Industrial Commission,' the Illinois Supreme
Court had to decide whether voluntary payments made by an employer to
an employee, under a general policy of paying all help for time lost due to
illness or accident, could be considered as compensation payments so as
to allow the employer to deduct the amount thereof from a subsequent
award of workmen's compensation. The employee had strained himself
while lifting some bulky machinery, had been referred to the company
doctor, and had been given treatment for a hernia over a period of weeks.
During this time, the employee was absent from work but was paid his
full weekly salary. Upon his return to work, the employee was obliged to
perform lighter duties but continued to draw the same salary. He subsequently filed an application for adjustment of his claim, maintaining
that the payment of wages during his absence was a voluntary and a
gratuitous act on the part of the employer, performed without reference
to any liability arising under the workmen's compensation statute. The
employer contended that, as the wages were paid with knowledge of the
accident and without denial of liability, they constituted payment on
account of the compensation. An award of compensation made by the
arbitrator and sustained by the commission was confirmed by the circuit
court.

DUE EMPLOYEE

On proceedings in error, the Supreme Court, relying on Marshall
Field & Co. v. Industrial Commission,2 ruled that where payments are
10 Prior to the present statute, incompetents and infants had until one year after
the removal of their respective disabilities in which to contest a will: Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1935, Ch. 148, § 7. See also James, Ill. Probate Act. Anno., § 90, p. 93 et seq.
11 Horner, Probate Practice and Estates, § 90, p. 109 et seq.
1403 Ill. 587, 88 N. E. (2d) 24 (1949).
2 305 Ill. 134, 137 N. E. 121 (1922). The claim for compensation there involved
was filed within six months after the last payment of wages but beyond the ordinary
period allowed for the filing of claims. Inasmuch as the wage payments had been
made with knowledge of the injury and without denial of liability, the court held
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made by an employer to his employee with full knowledge of the employee's accidental injury and without denial of liability under the act,
such wage payments are to be considered as payments upon any compensation which may subsequently be awarded. While the Marshall Field
case had merely decided that voluntary wage payments made by the
employer could serve to toll the limitation period prescribed by Section
24 of the act,3 the court in the instant case stated that the act of the
employer in paying wages should be uniformly construed for all purposes.4 As a consequence, the order for the award was reversed. This
extension of the doctrine of the Marshall Field case, which had served to
aid the employee, now operates to accord equal treatment to the employer. If, by making payments, he is to be held to have waived the limitation period, he should, by the same token, receive credit for the payments so made.

that the claim was filed in apt time. It was said, in United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Industrial Commission, 364 Ill. 346 at 349, 4 N. E. (2d) 487 at 488 (1936), by way
of further explanation, that the "rule is based upon the doctrine that when the

employer has knowledge of the Injury and does not deny liability, the employee has
a right to regard the payments as having been made under the act and is not bound
to make demand for further compensation as long as the payments are continued."
See also Tyler v. Industrial Commission, 364 Ill. 381, 4 N. E. (2d) 637 (1936).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 161.
4 The voluntary character of the payment was evidenced by the testimony of the
employer's manager who, when asked why the wages had been paid, answered:
"We have a policy down there . . . that we pay everybody, no matter if they are
sick they get straight time. If they are hurt they get straight time ... and we take
what the insurance company pays them. They don't lose a cent." See 403 Ill. 587 at
592, 88 N. E. (2d) 24 at 26.

